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THE COMPATIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING, INTERROGATON, AND
PREVENTING TORTURE
Steven M. Kleinman*
I was honored by the invitation to serve on this panel and to
share my observations concerning this vital geo-strategic topic.  I
must admit, however, that it is also something of a surreal experi-
ence for me.  In the course of twenty-five years of operational intel-
ligence experience, where my task was to gather actionable
intelligence information from individuals who ran the gambit from
helpful to hostile, no one outside the profession seemed at all in-
terested in either what I did or, of more importance to our pur-
poses here, how I did it.  In recent years, however, I have found
myself debating the efficacy of various interrogation strategies with
people who have never even observed a real-world interrogation,
much less conducted an interrogation.  I have also discovered that
the positions on interrogation and detainee policy taken by far too
many individuals, both inside and outside government, have been
informed primarily by fictionalized portrayals found in the media
rather than the ground truth of reality.
While the perspectives I offer to you today have been indelibly
shaped from my personal experiences, I have been encouraged by
the support and agreement I have received by some of the very best
interrogators in this nation’s law enforcement, military, and intelli-
gence communities.  While our professional journeys have fol-
lowed disparate paths, our experiences have consistently led us to
the same operational assessment: cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment of a prisoner, detainee, or suspect has consistently
proven, over time, to be an ineffective means of gathering accu-
rate, comprehensive, and timely information.  Conversely, an oper-
ational framework employing strategies centered on what might be
described as rapport-building and enlightened cultural finesse has con-
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sistently proven, over time, to be a very effective and useful ap-
proach to the interrogation challenge.
I would like to begin by posing three fundamental questions
that would seem to be most germane to our discussions here today:
1. Are human rights a vital national interest?
2. Is interrogation a critical means of collecting irreplaceable
information in support of a nation’s interests?
3. Do human rights and interrogation represent incompatible
interests?
I won’t spend time in addressing the first question as those of
us gathered here for this important symposium would categorically
agree: beyond the moral and legal arguments, respect for human
rights promotes and enhances the role of a nation in the interna-
tional domain and materially influences how a nation is viewed by
both its allies and potential adversaries.
The answer to the second question is a bit more complex.
Given the lingering public controversy over how this nation con-
ducts the interrogation of detainees,1 one might understandably
wonder if the possible outcome (i.e., the intelligence collected)
outweighs the dimmed perception of the American character that
has resulted from the graphic reports of prisoner abuses.2  The
short answer to that specific question is that it does not.
However, given the nature of the asymmetric counterterrorist
and counterinsurgent efforts, where linked networks of non-State
actors are difficult to identify, much less understand through tech-
nical means of intelligence collection (e.g., signals and imagery in-
telligence), interrogation has become a primary means of gaining
insight into the vital centers of gravity such as planning, financing,
safe havens, and training.3  In sum, the most direct and productive
path to collecting much-needed intelligence in this context is to
ask the only individuals who might know: a captured terrorist or
insurgent.
If, however, interrogators believe they must employ coercive
means to obtain this information, wouldn’t those methods (as
1 See, e.g., Tom Lasseter, Abuse Plagued Afghan Camps Too; Guantanamo: Beyond the
law—Close Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 16, 2008, at A3; Stephanie Nebehay, Departing Ar-
bour attacks use of torture, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 8, 2008, at A21.
2 See, e.g., Karen DeYoung & Josh White, Guantanamo Prison Likely to Stay Open
Through Bush Term, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2007, at A02.
3 See Carlissa R. Carson, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: How Its Inability to
Curb Abusive Interrogations Threatens the Future Treatment of Detainees and the United States’
Reputation, 57 EMORY L.J. 695, 696 (2008) (“Interrogation is necessary because detain-
ees may provide insight into future terrorist attacks, information relating to finan-
ciers, and the location of terrorist leaders who direct terrorist activities.”).
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noted earlier) create the circumstances where damage to the na-
tion’s image offsets the value of the information?  Wouldn’t such
activities drive a wedge between the United States and its allies
while concurrently inflaming our adversaries?  The answer lies in a
better understanding of what interrogation truly is and, perhaps
more importantly, what it is not.
The popular view of interrogation is unfortunately shaped
more by fiction than fact.  Most of us have been exposed to some
form of interrogation through the entertainment media.  As a re-
sult, too many people—including some senior government offi-
cials—have formed strong opinions about interrogation solely
based on these fictionalized portrayals written by Hollywood
screenwriters (who, it should be emphasized, are unlikely to have
any direct experience with real-world interrogations).  In an at-
tempt to correct the public misperception of this arcane craft, I
offer the following brief overview of its key features.
Interrogation is:
• systematic questioning of an individual (i.e., the source) who
is believed to possess information of intelligence value.
• In instances where the source resists answering questions,
the interrogator may attempt to gain a useful degree of coop-
eration through subtle efforts of persuasion.  The strategies
most commonly employed incorporate the same six princi-
ples of persuasion we are exposed to almost daily in the form
of advertising (i.e., social proof, reciprocity, authority, consis-
tency, liking, and scarcity4).
• Interrogation, at its core, involves both a carefully managed
exchange of information and a vigilant management of the
relationship.  In this regard, interrogation shares a consider-
able degree of structure and process with negotiation and
conflict resolution.5
Upon reviewing the above, one might ask where harsher meth-
ods—those techniques that introduce varying degrees of psycho-
logical, emotional, and physical stress or pressure—might fit into
this construct.  The brief yet critical answer is that they do not.  The
relevant sections of the Geneva Convention are quite clear to this
interrogator.  These accords contain the following passage, widely
known as Common Article 3, which sets forth precise guidance
with respect to the type of treatment that is specifically prohibited:
4 See Robert Cialdini, et al., The Science of Influence: Using Six Principles of Persuasion
to Negotiate and Mediate more Effectively, 9 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 20, 21 (2002).
5 See generally Deborah Davis, et. al., Psychological Weapons of Influence: Applications
in the Interrogation Room, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2006, at 14.
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“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including mem-
bers of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, relig-
ion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To
this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b)
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in partic-
ular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.”6
If we lived in a purely amoral world and conducted our affairs
with little regard for the law, I would submit that adhering to this
standard of conduct would still be in our best interests.  I base this
assertion on over twenty years of experience conducting and study-
ing interrogations as well as the feedback I consistently receive
from the most accomplished interrogators from both the law en-
forcement and intelligence communities.  To emphasize the point
once again, this combined experience strongly suggests that over
time (1) strategies that focus on what is commonly referred to as a
rapport-based approach have consistently proven to be highly ef-
fective in gathering accurate, comprehensive, and timely intelli-
gence,7 and (2) strategies that employ coercive themes have
consistently proven ineffective in gathering accurate, comprehen-
sive, and timely intelligence.
In making the argument against the use of coercive measures
in interrogation, there are two compelling psychophysical and stra-
tegic reasons that speak directly to the heart of the difference be-
tween a rapport-based approach and one that relies on force.  First,
it must be clearly understood that, under the right conditions (or,
more appropriately, the wrong conditions), any given individual
can apply force in a way that would cause any other individual to
respond in a specific manner.  For example, under prolonged du-
ress, dire threats, and/or the application of severe pain, an individ-
6 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
7 See TOM WILLIAMSON, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH, REGULA-
TION, 24 (2006) (arguing that the rapport-based approach is superior to an aggressive
approach when dealing with Al-Qaeda operatives).
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ual can be compelled to answer any question—including questions
for which they have no relevant answer.8  When coercion is em-
ployed along with its seemingly inseparable partner, the leading
question, the individual under duress will soon make an inescapable
calculus: answer the question in the manner clearly desired by the
overseer (I do not deign to label this individual an interrogator)
and the pain will cease.  In addition to creating the potential for
forced fabrication, the overseer of coercion is left without any reason-
able means of assessing the prisoner’s veracity from the observation
of body language or careful attunement to speech and tonality that
would be more readily available under more benign conditions.9
The individual in focus under such a scenario (i.e., the de-
tainee, prisoner, or suspect) can be forced to say and do practically
anything; they are, by definition, forced into a state of compliance.
Obtaining a prisoner’s compliance was, in fact, the primary focus
of Chinese and North Vietnamese interrogators during the Korean
and Vietnam Wars, respectfully.10  Under severe duress, a number
of Allied prisoners, in accordance with the directions of their inter-
rogators, made oral and written statements about American chemi-
cal and biological warfare programs and attacks that were complete
fabrications.11
Coercion is a horrifically effective means of gaining compli-
ance.  Compliance, however, is useful only in generating propa-
ganda (i.e., that which a country or culture considers to be truth,
but is not necessarily true).  In contrast, the interrogator seeking to
benefit from an individual’s memory of what is true must establish
the type of relationship that would lead to cooperation.
This, then, leads to the second argument against coercion,
and one that demonstrates why a rapport-based model of interro-
gation might be considered an absolute requirement in the pursuit of
useful information.  Just as signals intelligence seeks to gather in-
8 See generally Jeremy Newton, False Confession: Considerations for Modern Interrogation
Techniques at Home and War, 9 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 63 (2008).
9 See Hearing Suspended Because of Objection on Senate Floor—Coercive Investigative Co-
ercive Interrogation Techniques: Do They Work, Are They Reliable, and What Did the FBI Know
About Them: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of
John E. Cloonan, Retired FBI Special Agent, indicating that the “vast majority of de-
tainees questioned under these stressful conditions were of little or no value as
sources of useful intelligence.”)
10 See, e.g., China Inspired Interrogations At Guanta´namo, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2008, at
A1 (indicating that the interrogation manual utilized by the Chinese was entitled
“Communist Coercive Methods for Eliciting Individual Compliance”).
11 See id.
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formation by capturing electronic emanations12 and imagery intel-
ligence by collecting photographic and digital representations of
selected sites,13 interrogation seeks the accurate, comprehensive,
and unbiased information about people, places, and plans stored
in the memory of a detained individual.  A major challenge in this
regard—one an interrogator overlooks to his or her detriment—is
the fact that, according to behavioral scientists, the human mem-
ory is fragile and can often prove to be unreliable.14  This is true
even under benign, non-threatening circumstances.15
Research psychologists have consistently demonstrated that
personal and environmental stressors may significantly diminish
the ability of any individual to accurately recall detailed informa-
tion.16  Putting this into an operational context, a detainee who has
been subjected to sleep deprivation, overt threats, dietary manipu-
lation, and extended interrogations is unlikely to be able to reliably
and fully report information he may possess even if they desired to
do so.
Similarly, a full exploration of that memory cannot be accom-
plished through the mechanism of forced compliance; access to an
individual’s memory cannot be forced.  Rather, in a very real sense,
the interrogator must be invited in, and this requires the bridge of
cooperation.  Within the context of an interrogation, a constructive
measure of cooperation—or operational accord—is the key to
crossing the bridge from detachment to engagement.  While the
reasons why an individual may decide to cooperate with an interro-
gator are vast, from trust and affiliation to pragmatism and expedi-
ency, the ability to take full advantage of a source’s knowledgeability
rests almost entirely on their willingness to open this door.
Thus, a useful framework for effective interrogation must in-
corporate two critical components.  First, the interrogator must
employ a strategy to win the individual’s cooperation (not force
12 Michael V. Hayden, The Challenge of Sharing Foreign Signals Intelligence, 19 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 247, 247 n.3 (2005) (“Signals intelligence is comprised
of communications intelligence and electronics intelligence. Communications intelli-
gence consists of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromag-
netic means.”).
13 See Glen Sulmasy, et al, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International
Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 625, 630 (2007) (imagery intelligence includes both photo
intelligence and infrared imagery).
14 See E. Kevin Kelloway, et al., Eyewitness Testimony in Occupational Accident Investiga-
tions: Towards a Research Agenda, 28 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 115, 119 (discussing human
memory in the context of eyewitness testimony as “fragile, malleable, and susceptible
to forgetting” even under “optimal conditions”).
15 Id.
16 See generally DANIEL REISBERG & PAULA HERTEL, MEMORY AND EMOTION 94 (2004).
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compliance).  Second, the nature of that strategy must exclude
means that would substantially undermine the individual’s physi-
cal, emotional, or psychological stability.  In other words, the effort
to earn the individual’s cooperation must not simultaneously di-
minish their ability to recall fully and accurately the information
sought by the interrogator.
From this perspective, a coercive approach has the quality of a
Catch-22 scenario.  The stress imposed upon a prisoner to force
them to respond may also be expected to compromise their con-
structive recall ability.  Apart from the significant legal and moral
elements that would argue against the use of coercive interrogation
methods, it is also fundamentally an operationally ineffective ap-
proach.  In essence, if the intended outcome is the production of
propaganda (or at least a recitation of the interrogator’s precon-
ceived truths), then the overarching theme must be one of coer-
cion to achieve compliance.  In contrast, if the intended outcome
is the gathering of what is true (i.e., accurate information and use-
ful insights that may or may not be what the interrogator expected
or desired), then the overarching theme must be one informed by
enlightened cultural finesse to elicit an individual’s cooperation.
With respect to the third question posed at the beginning—
are interrogation and human rights incompatible interests—we are
at what the former CEO of Intel Corporation, Andy Grove, would
describe as a strategic inflection point.17  We either continue down
a path that has been, at best, problematic or we carefully reexam-
ine our policies and doctrine governing the interrogation and de-
tention of detainees.  Sadly, while I can make a strong argument
against the employment of forceful interrogation methods, we do
not know by any objective measure which paradigm—rapport-
based approaches or coercion—is fundamentally more effective.
That is to say, neither approach is based on science.
At the same time, we can say with a far greater degree of cer-
tainty that the revelations of prisoner abuse, secret prisons, and ex-
traordinary renditions have not only enraged our current and
potential adversaries (e.g., images of the abuses at Abu Ghraib con-
tinue to be used as a primary recruiting theme targeting young,
Muslim males in Europe18), but also have driven an ever-deepen-
17 See generally ANDY GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE (1996). See also LOUISE
KELLY & CHRISTOPHER A. BOOTH, DICTIONARY OF STRATEGY: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT A-
Z 153 (2004).
18 William Dalrymple, Democracy, not terrorism, is the engine of political Islam, CAN-
BERRA TIMES (Australia), Sept. 24, 2007, at A9.
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ing wedge between the United States and even its closest allies.19
Until the operational question can be reliably answered, the ongo-
ing geo-strategic costs of an ill-conceived approach to interrogation
would alone argue for a foundational change.
What then, is the way ahead?  Perhaps one of the most useful
frameworks for addressing this important policy issue would be one
borrowed from the philosopher, Aristotle.  Since interrogation is
an integral part of the larger strategic communications campaign,
Aristotle’s three-point approach to the art of rhetoric is a relevant
starting point.20
The first element is logos, or an appeal based on reason and
logic.  In the art and science of interrogation, the emphasis has
long been on the former while the latter has been largely ne-
glected.  From what I’ve learned through extensive archival re-
search, the last significant scientific study of interrogation was
completed in the 1950s.21  Imagine the advances since then just in
the broad field of behavioral science and how those new under-
standings might inform a contemporary model of interrogation.
The American way of interrogation must reflect a logical approach
that judiciously integrates law and science to generate a new stan-
dard.  Why argue for exceptions to long-standing international law
on the treatment of detainees if an objective assessment of the ex-
cepted form of treatment demonstrates that it does not consistently
produce the desired operational outcome (and would concomi-
tantly prove politically counterproductive)?
The second element is pathos, or an intuitive sense for the
hopes and fears of others.  This suggests that those who conduct
interrogations on our behalf need to possess a strong level of em-
pathy and even sympathy (what Major Sherwood Moran, the famed
World War II Marine Corps interrogator in the Pacific referred to
as “sympathetic common sense”22).  It is exceptionally difficult to
legislate morality.  No single individual owns the moral compass by
which all others must navigate through life and I certainly do not
pretend to serve in that capacity on this or any other issue.  None-
19 Peter Grier, White House backs down on wartime powers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 19, 2007, at 1.
20 See Reed Johnson, The Art of Interrogation; Experts Say Subtle Psychological Ploys May
Be Better Than Thumbscrews When it Comes to Getting Terror Suspects to Confess, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2003, at 1.
21 See Robert A. Fein, Prologue to EDUCING INFORMATION: INTERROGATION: SCIENCE
AND ART—FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE xi, xi-xii (Robert A. Fein ed., 2006), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf.
22 Sherwood Moran, Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field
(July 17, 1943) 3, available at http://www.w-z.com/articles/article023.pdf.
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theless, beyond the realm of laws and practical concerns, the inter-
national community will judge whether our actions reflect a
humane approach to the difficult challenges before us.  Mr.
George Frenkel, another World War II-era interrogator, captured
this salient point here in an observation offered during a 2007 vet-
eran’s reunion: “During the many interrogations, I never laid
hands on anyone.  We extracted information in a battle of the wits.
I’m proud to say I never compromised my humanity.”23
While addressing the topic of humane treatment, it is impor-
tant to note that one of the most critical yet often overlooked
points in the larger debate over detainee policy is the concept of
reciprocity.  There is, to be sure, no guarantee that an American
citizen held in detention by a foreign power or non-State actor will
be humanely treated just because that is standard to which we hold
ourselves.  At the same time, flagrant violations of international
norms have forced us to yield the moral high ground and would
leave the nation poorly positioned to seek the support of the world
community if Americans were held in indefinite detention and sub-
jected to harsh treatment.  While this did not stop the North
Vietnamese from torturing U.S. military personnel during the Viet-
nam War,24 our steadfast resistance to responding in kind led us to
achieve a sense of moral victory within an otherwise difficult and
controversial conflict.The final element is ethos, or a standard of
ethics.  As with the professions of law and medicine, interrogation
can trace its history back to antiquity; unlike these professions,
however, it lacks both an objective knowledge base (the logos noted
above) and an overarching and inviolate standard of conduct that
governs the activities of its practitioners.  Had such a standard of
ethical conduct been in place, one might expect that the series of
abuses that have occurred since the attacks on September 11th
could have been prevented.  I strongly endorse the concept of cre-
ating a small corps of carefully selected, well-educated, and exten-
sively trained individuals to conduct strategic and operational level
interrogation on behalf of the U.S. Intelligence Community writ
large.  Adhering to a truly professional framework, the develop-
ment of a professional cadre would include mentored professional
development, continuing education, a rigorous standard of ethics,
23 Petula Dvorak, Fort Hunt’s Quiet Men Break Silence on WWII; Interrogators Fought
‘Battle of Wits,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2007, at A1.
24 Major William A. Hudson, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Incul-
cate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153, 155 (1993).
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and active oversight.  Both the potential gains and losses are of
such magnitude that anything else is indefensible.
The legendary master of strategy, Sun Tzu, emphasized the
need for the wise sovereign or esteemed general to know both him-
self and the enemy.  If this proves to be the case, he wrote, victory
can be anticipated in every battle.25  If the sovereign or general
knows himself but not the enemy, or knows the enemy but not
himself, victory can only be expected in 50 of 100 battles.26  And if
the sovereign or general knows neither himself nor his enemy, vic-
tory will at best be elusive.27
How well have we followed this sage advice?  Many would
agree that we know so little about an adversary that speaks a lan-
guage few in the West understand, emerges from a culture far re-
moved from our own, and has a fundamentally different view of
the modern, globalized world.  If Sun Tzu’s calculus is correct, we
can expect to be victorious only half the time.
The more vexing question, however, is how well do we know
ourselves?  What actions are we willing to take in what is now being
referred to as “the long war?”  How far are we willing to drift from
the standards of conduct we have long claimed to embrace?  Until
we are prepared to resolutely answer these questions, can we ex-
pect victory to be anything but elusive?
In my view, the answer to our current challenge rests in the
wisdom of yet another ancient philosophical text, the Tao Te Ching.
In chapter 33, the author, Lao Tse, offers the following insights:
Knowing others is intelligence;
knowing ourselves is true wisdom.
Mastering others is strength;
mastering ourselves is true power.28
I close, then, by encouraging us to end our obsession with in-
telligence and strength and instead seek to embrace true wisdom
and true power.  Anything less is beneath us.
25 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 13 ¶ 18 (Lionel Giles trans., El Paso Norte Press
2005) (1910).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 LAO TZU, THE TAO TE CHING OF LAO TZU 33 (Brian Browne Walker, trans.,
Macmillan 1996).
